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Abstract

As women take on a continuously larger role in the legal field,
it has become tremendously important to study and understand
the impact women are having on the judicial system. This
work explores the role of women in the judiciary. Specifically,
I examine the Supreme Court of the United States to find
out whether women’s jurisprudence differs from that of their
male colleagues. For this paper, I limit my examination to
cases involving equal protection under the law. The theory I
employ is that of Carol Gilligan, who argues that across many
realms, women have a uniquely different voice than men
(1982). Through a quantitative analysis of 49 cases dealing
with issues of equal protection under the law, I show that
Gilligan’s theory helps us understand how cases are decided
in the United States Supreme Court. Additionally, I show how
the “Different Voice” model improves upon existing models
of judicial decision making by Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, and
Harold Spaeth. This paper expands current gender and politics
literature, which had previously used Gilligan’s insights
to examine U.S. state legislatures, by analyzing decision
making in the Supreme Court. This paper thus illustrates that
women, due to their unique life experiences, have a different
understanding of the law in regards to equality and equal
protection under the law.
Jorgensen, K. (2012). Equal protection under the law: Do
female justices have a difference voice?, Journal of Purdue
Undergraduate Research, 2, 28–35. doi:10.5703/jpur.02.1.05
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EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW:
Do Female Justices Have a Different Voice?
Katherine Jorgensen, Political Science

INTRODUCTION
This paper examines how female justices view and
articulate individual rights and the implications of the
“Feminine Voice Model” (Maveety, 1996) regarding
equal protection under law in America. More women are
entering the legal profession, which may be expected to
lead to more female judges at all levels of the American
judicial system. Women used to be 9% of law school

Figure 1. The four women who have served on the Supreme
Court of the United States. From left to right: Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor (Ret.), Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Elena Kagan in the Justices’
Conference Room, prior to Justice Kagan’s Investiture
Ceremony on October 1, 2010. Photo courtesy of the
Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States.

students, but as of 2010 comprise 47% of law school
enrollment (American Bar Association, 2011). Further, the
two most recent appointments to the Supreme Court of
the United States have produced a 3 to 6 ratio of women
to men on the court. I will show that this increase in
participation by women in the legal field has resulted in a
clear trend toward equality as a social norm as female law
scholars tend to fight for these rights as lawyers and rule
on them as judges.
I examine cases during the Rehnquist Era (1994–2004),
focusing on the judgments of Justice O’Connor and
Justice Ginsburg—comparing their opinions, concurring
opinions, and dissenting opinions. I demonstrate how
O’Connor and Ginsburg sought to defend equal protection
during their tenure together. Through the examination
of their judgments I illustrate that their decisions were
based in part on the Feminine Voice Model (Maveety,
1996). This model suggests that “Women’s judgments
are tied to feelings of empathy and compassion” based
upon past experiences (Gilligan, 1982, p. 69). I argue that
the Feminine Voice Model is the key identifier as to why
female U.S. Supreme Court Justices, who exhibit different
religious backgrounds and theoretically opposing political
ideologies, still arrived at the same legal conclusions in a
majority of cases regarding equal protection.
This paper presents three central findings. First, with
regards to equal protection under the law, O’Connor and
Ginsburg rule together in a majority of cases (65%) to
uphold equal protection and expand equal rights. Second,
when O’Connor and Ginsburg rule separately (35% of

equal protection under the law

29

cases), they both seek to support equal protection under
the law. Finally, this paper shows that in cases regarding
gender equality, O’Connor and Ginsburg have the
strongest opinions and are more likely than their male
counterparts to rule and work together to protect the
rights of women.

Feminine Voice Model
The Feminine Voice Model has become a serious
contender in untangling and understanding what kind
of ideology women bring to the world of politics. Since
Carol Gilligan released her book In a Different Voice
in 1982, scholars have extended her initial examination
of differences between men and women in regards to
morality, rights, and law to question whether the model
applies to those in governmental roles.
For example, Lyn Kathlene applied Gilligan’s ideas to
women who hold legislative positions. Kathlene points
out that the political field is one dominated by males and
masculine concepts. Thus, the influence of women in
the political realm requires further research in order to
fully note how women have changed or impacted law
and policy (Kathlene, 2005). Kathlene highlights the key
differences between men and women regarding creating
new laws. By examining the differences between men
and women as Kathlene outlines, I will show how this
theory can be applied to women in the judiciary in their
interpretation of laws.
Kathlene (2005) makes a distinction between masculine
and feminine approaches to law (Table 1). The masculine
approach is defined as an “ethic of justice” (p. 215).
Men typically see people as being self-interested and in
competition with one another. The masculine approach
suggests men prioritize individual rights, but have a strong
tendency to support the rights of the majority (p. 216).

Women, on the other hand, exhibit an “ethic of care”.
Kathlene writes, “Women are more concerned with
the interworking of society and the interconnectedness
of people” (2005, p. 216). This implies that women
address the needs of society by upholding the equality
of individuals before individual rights. However, as a
consequence of protecting equal rights, women do a
greater job than men of protecting individual rights.
Acting under the “ethic of care,” women’s main objective
is to create a society that guarantees all people equal
protection under the law.
Baines discusses the expansion of Gilligan’s ideas to the
interpretation of law. She points to the work of Katharine
T. Bartlett, who suggested that female justices exhibit
“feminist practical reasoning” (as cited in Baines,
2009, p. 34). Unlike other forms of practical reasoning,
“feminist practical reasoning takes its direction from
facts, experiences, and contexts” (Baines, 2009, p. 36).
Baines’ analysis is in agreement with other legal scholars
such as Sherry and Sharon Rush, who hold female justices
are more likely than male justices to decide cases using
contextual analysis (as cited in Baines, 2009, p. 35).

Alternative Approaches
Other models for judicial decision making include
the “Attitudinal Model” and the “Legal Model.” The
Attitudinal Model suggests that Supreme Court Justices
decide cases based on their personal moral convictions,
political ideology, societal norms, and political obligations
(Segal & Spaeth, 2002). The Legal Model asserts that
judicial decision making is generated from a strict
textual interpretation of law and legal doctrine, generated
from past cases (George & Epstein, 1992). This view of
judicial decision making has been labeled as “mechanical
jurisprudence, because the process by which judges
reach a decision is highly structured . . . it consists of

•

Ethic of Justice
View self as autonomous

Ethic of Care
• Views self in connection with community/others

•

Human interactions are separate and competitive

•

Distinguishes difference between subjective and
objective knowledge, favors objective

• Human interactions are part of a continuous web of
relationships

•

Main focus is on addressing individual rights

• Integrates objective and subjective knowledge, but
believes both have a bias
• Main focus is on addressing needs/equality

Table 1. Masculine approach (Ethic of Justice)/Feminine approach (Ethic of Care). After Kathlene, 2005.
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three steps (1) observation of similarity between cases,
(2) announcement of the rule of law in the first case, and
(3) application of that law in the second case” (George &
Epstein, 1992, p. 324).
In the examination of the jurisprudence of O’Connor and
Ginsburg, bits of the Attitudinal Model and Legal Model
will be evident. This is because the Feminine Voice Model
encompasses many of the characteristics represented in
these two models; I will demonstrate how these views are
combined in the Feminine Voice Model in a way that is
applicable to and apparent in Ginsburg and O’Connor.

METHODS
The remainder of the paper contains two substantive
sections and conclusions. The first section is an in-depth
analysis of the jurisprudence of O’Connor and Ginsburg.
In this section, I compare and contrast their different
ideologies, illustrating the Feminine Voice Model. I then
analyze the judgments of O’Connor and Ginsburg in
landmark cases concerning abortion and discrimination.
This section demonstrates how they derived a ruling
and whether there is evidence showing that the outcome
fits within the Feminine Voice Model. This research
highlights where O’Connor and Ginsburg differentiate in
areas of substantive due process, judicial restraint, judicial
independence, and judicial activism.

Figure 2. Sandra Day O’Connor, U.S. Supreme Court justice.
Photo courtesy of the Collection of the Supreme Court of the
United States.

The second section of this paper consists of quantitative
analysis. This data is composed of all cases regarding
equal protection of rights that occurred between 1994 and
2005. For this research, equal protection of rights refers to
those rights that aren’t explicitly listed in the Bill of Rights
(such as discrimination, privacy, sexual harassment,
and choice). These rights typically fall under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
examining these cases I record how often Ginsburg and
O’Connor ruled similarly and differently in order to
demonstrate that there is a common theme represented by
both of them in upholding equal protection of law.

Jurisprudence
O’Connor has been revered as the moderate centrist of
the Rehnquist Era, typically being the fifth vote in the
majority of 5-4 decisions (Domino, 2010). O’Connor’s use
of precedent in accordance with conservative approaches
to fundamental rights (Maveety, 1996) and application
of the Equal Protection Clause illuminates her role as
a preserver of equal rights for all. O’Connor supports
judicial activism that is both conservatively and liberally

Figure 3. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U.S. Supreme Court justice.
Photo courtesy of the Collection of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
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motivated, but she tempers this activism by narrowing the
decisions, refusing to issue any broad principles (Keck,
2004). This type of ruling shows that O’Connor does
not fall into either of the aforementioned approaches as
she is not ruling in a manner that is solely based on her
personal/political beliefs or precedent. O’Connor’s use
of these many different judicial practices demonstrates
feminine legal reasoning, a key component in the
Feminine Voice Model.
O’Connor frequently writes her own opinions as a way
to assert her judicial independence, assuring that her
decision is fully understood as to how she interprets
the Constitution (Maveety, 2008). O’Connor tries to
avoid substantive due process, viewing her job as a
justice as “interpreting and applying law not making
it” (Nomination of S. D. O’Connor, 1981). This is a key
difference between her and Ginsburg. Ginsburg believes
that the development of rights had been embedded in the
Supreme Court’s history and it is the obligation of the
Court to continue to define and protect the rights of all
citizens (Nomination of R. B. Ginsburg, 1993).
Much like O’Connor, Ginsburg is known for representing
centrist ideologies. Ginsburg effectively avoids labels such
as conservative or liberal. Rather she is “a conservative by
maintaining our oldest ideals and a liberal by beckoning
us into the new world” (Merritt & Liebermann, 2004,
p. 48). It is this jurisprudence that is continually displayed
in her rulings to uphold all rights, thus maintaining a
commitment to opportunity and equality for all (Merritt
& Liebermann, 2004). It is clear that the jurisprudence
represented by both O’Connor and Ginsburg corresponds
to the Feminine Voice Model insofar as both justices view
it as their responsibility to protect these rights. This is
because female judges empathize with the situation of
having been denied certain rights, based on belonging
to a marginalized group in society.

Case Analysis: Abortion
Another critical indicator on how these justices view
equality comes from their thoughts on abortion with
respect to the Constitution. While neither Ginsburg nor
O’Connor sat on the Court for Roe v. Wade, they both
hold distinct views on what this case truly meant for
abortion entitlement. Both O’Connor and Ginsburg found
the finding of Roe to be insufficient. Ginsburg thought
that Roe didn’t fully give women the personal freedom
to choose; every act of abortion according to Roe was
a decision that couldn’t be made solely by the women;
rather, that choice must be made in concurrence with her
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physician (Garrow, 1998). O’Connor, on the other hand,
found a problem with the rationale used to determine
when a pregnancy could be aborted (Garrow, 1998). She
said, “The Roe framework is clearly on a collision course
with itself . . . and there is no justification in law or logic
for the trimester framework” (Garrow, 1998, p. 645).
When O’Connor ruled on abortion in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey (1992), she followed character and decided the
case based on stare decisis, upholding the central finding
of Roe. However, she took this chance to move away from
the medically focused decision to establish abortion as
a right that favors the equality of women. In a plurality
opinion, O’Connor, along with Kennedy and Souter, wrote,
“. . . choices central to personal dignity and autonomy
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment” (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1992).
A year after Casey, Ginsburg was questioned about her
views on abortion during her confirmation hearing. The
Senate was concerned with whether she believed abortion
was a matter of both equal protection and individual
autonomy (Nomination of R. B. Ginsburg, 1993). She
responded as follows:
The decision whether or not to bear a child
is a central to a women’s life, her well being,
and her dignity . . . when government controls
this decision for her she is being treated as less
than a fully adult human responsible for her
choices . . . as well if the government imposes
restraints that impede a women’s right to choose
it is disadvantaging her, because of her sex.
(Nomination of R. B. Ginsburg, 1993)
O’Connor and Ginsburg ruled together for the first time
in 2000 to uphold abortions rights in Stenberg v. Carhart
(2000). Both Ginsburg and O’Connor wrote concurring
opinions on this, making almost identical claims that the
Nebraska regulation was in violation of the past precedent
founded in Casey, and it placed an undue burden on
women when trying to obtain an abortion (Stenberg v.
Carhart, 2000).
In 2007, Ginsburg was faced with revisiting abortion in
Gonzalez v. Carhart, which challenged the 2003 PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act. In her dissenting opinion,
Ginsburg upheld the views she had openly expressed
during her confirmation hearing and in writings previous
to her appointment. She claimed that by allowing for
the partial-birth abortion ban to stand, the Court was
“chipping away at a right declared again and again by

the Court” (Gonzalez v. Carhart, 2007). These cases,
opinions, and thoughts on abortion are all intertwined
with autonomy of the individual and the equality of
women, all of which exclusively relate to the concepts in
the Feminine Voice Model.

Case Analysis: Discrimination
In the area of discrimination O’Connor and Ginsburg
sought to defend equality of people based on gender,
race, and sexual orientation. However, in these cases
the differences between O’Connor and Ginsburg are
illuminated. When examining their rulings in these cases,
we find that they occasionally wind up on different sides.
With further investigation into their rulings it is clear that
they are both trying to protect equality for minorities, but
their views differ.
The landmark decision of United States v. Virginia
(1996) exemplifies this and the Feminine Voice Model.
United States v. Virginia challenged the Virginia Military
Institution’s (VMI) male-only status, as it was a public
institution receiving state and federal funding. VMI
argued that it must remain open exclusively to men to
preserve the integrity of the university as the programs
would have to be altered in order to admit women. VMI
also argued that it had established a program exclusively
for women that paralleled that of VMI. Ginsburg wrote
the majority opinion, with which O’Connor concurred,
that, “We hold that Virginia has violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause. Because the
remedy proffered by Virginia—the Mary Baldwin
VWIL—doesn’t cure the Constitutional violation i.e.
it does not provide equal opportunity” (United States
v. Virginia, 1996). She follows with a response to the
claim that VMI would have to modify its program in
this statement: “Equal protection as it applies to gender
classification means state actors may not rely on overly
broad generalizations” (United States v. Virginia, 1996).
The language used by Ginsburg throughout this decision
supports Gilligan's model. In a recent interview Ginsburg
talked about the VMI decision, stating that discrimination
based on sex is completely unacceptable in today’s time
and women are to be regarded as equal to men in all
capacities of life (Ginsburg, 2011).
Discrimination based on one’s sexual orientation is still a
challenge for today’s Court as it faces questions regarding
the right to gay marriage. Lawrence v. Texas (2003) and
Romer v. Evans (1996) are key cases in the establishment
of precedent regarding the equality of LGBT rights. In
these cases both Ginsburg and O’Connor sought to protect

the rights of homosexuals from government intrusion.
However, in Boy Scouts of America et al. v. Dale (2000),
the Court deviated from the precedent set by Romer.
Ginsburg and O’Connor ruled differently in this case
as they disagreed in how far the Constitution could be
extended to protect equality. O’Connor sided with the
majority, but in examining the logic within the opinion it
can be argued that she was still acting in association with
the Feminine Voice Model. The majority decision claimed
that the Boy Scouts’ refusal for Dale to be a scout leader
due to his sexual orientation did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment as the Boy Scouts is a private organization that
exercises outside the governmental realm and is protected
by the First Amendment’s right of association (Boy Scouts
of America et al. v. Dale, 2000). By siding with the majority
O’Connor was protecting the rights of one group that was
just as fundamental as Dale’s right. Ginsburg, on the other
hand, was more concerned with the rights of Dale than the
rights of the Boy Scouts. Thus, both were acting within the
bounds of the Feminine Voice Model.
The prior examples demonstrate that O’Connor and
Ginsburg desire to expand and protect equality of rights
for all. Their ideologies clearly portray Gilligan’s notion
that, “Changes in women’s rights change women’s
moral judgments and reasoning with justice by enabling
women to make judgments that are more tolerant and less
absolute” (1982, p. 149).

RESULTS
Table 2 shows that areas of sexual harassment, right
to privacy/choice, disability discrimination, and
governmental discrimination have the highest percent
difference between the number of times O’Connor and
Ginsburg decided together and the number of times they
ruled separately. While Ginsburg certainly took a more
predominant and emphatic view on the rights of those
with disabilities, which is demonstrated in her majority
opinion in Olmstead v. L. C. (Bagenstos, 2004), O’Connor
joined her in expanding rights and the equal protection
of law to the disabled. O’Connor and Ginsburg desired
for people to recognize that those with disabilities should
be regarded as equals (Bagenstos, 2004). They saw
these cases as a way to expand equality for handicapped
individuals in the workplace, schools, and other public/
governmental entities. In doing this they established a role
in society for people with disabilities, demonstrating that
they should be regarded and viewed as ordinary citizens.
The Rehnquist Court faced a higher percentage of sexual
harassment cases than previous courts as the third wave
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of the feminist movement was underway. O’Connor and
Ginsburg both faced the difficulty of sexual harassment
in the early stages of their careers (Maveety, 1996;
Ginsburg, 2011). Their strong stances on eliminating
sexual harassment toward women may well be a result
of the troubles they faced in their own careers. They also
view sexual harassment as a way to keep women under
male control. Ginsburg wrote, “The equal dignity of
individuals is part of the constitutional legacy” (Merritt
& Liebermann, 2004, p. 39). O’Connor and Ginsburg
undoubtedly view derogatory treatment toward women
as a violation of their personal dignity that needs
Constitutional protection to ensure the equality of women.

continually upheld a woman’s right to choose. These cases
also demonstrate equating women with men by putting
them in control of their own bodies.

The right to privacy and choice holds a variety of
implications and could have been classified with
governmental discrimination cases, but I found that these
cases posited questions that are critical to one’s being and
should be viewed independently. These cases go beyond
the realm of equality and tap into the arena of personal
autonomy. As seen in the Feminine Voice Model, men
are typically more concerned with individual autonomy
(Kathlene, 2005), but as Gilligan demonstrated, as women
gain more rights they begin to see themselves as individual
actors in society and begin to protect rights in that degree
(Gilligan, 1982). This also demonstrates that women’s
judgments are not tied to a moral conviction: as O’Connor
stated in her confirmation hearing, she is morally opposed
to abortion (Nomination of S. D. O’Connor, 1981), yet she

As shown in Table 2, in total, O'Connor and Ginsburg
ruled similarly 66% of the time in cases regarding the
equal protection of law; this demonstrates that even
though they come from different political and religious
backgrounds, they value the equality of the individual.
This is reiterated by opinions they have written as
both O’Connor and Ginsburg asserted their judicial
independence in numerous cases regarding equal
protection under the law.

Types of Cases
Sexual Harassment
Right to Privacy/Choice
Racial Discrimination/Affirmative Action
Age Discrimination
Disability Discrimination
Gender Discrimination
Governmental Discrimination
Total

The area I found most interesting was racial
discrimination and affirmative action. This is the only
area where the number of times they opposed each other
superseded the times they ruled similarly. However, a
careful reading of the opinions they wrote in a few of
these cases, such as Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), Gratz v.
Bollinger (2003), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña
(1995), shows they were both trying to protect equality
through different outlets.

CONCLUSION
This paper shows that the Feminine Voice Model applies
to female justices when hearing cases that involve equal
protection under law; there are three main findings
that support this claim. First, in cases regarding equal

Decided Together
80%
71%
38%
66%
77%
57%
71%
66%

Decided Separately
20%
29%
63%
32%
22%
43%
29%
34%

Table 2. O’Connor/Ginsburg voting similarities and differences in equal protection cases. Composed from 49 Supreme Court cases
regarding equal protection of law from 1994–2005.
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protection, O’Connor and Ginsburg ruled together the
majority of the time (66%) to expand equal protection
to minority groups. Second, even in instances of racial
discrimination and affirmative action where O’Connor
and Ginsburg part ways, they both still seek to expand
equal protection. For O’Connor, equality means not
establishing quotas through affirmative action as she
find this ultimately leads to inequality. For Ginsburg,
equality means the implementation of affirmative action
as an effective way to bring about equality. Third,
when looking at gender equality as a whole, Ginsburg
and O’Connor rule in a manner that promotes women’s
rights more than 90% of the time. These results support
the idea that there is a distinctly feminine voice taken
by justices in terms of equal protection under the law.
However, as previously mentioned, the Feminine Voice
Model does not apply to all aspects of law. Thus, the
Attitudinal Model and Legal Model may apply to female
justices in other areas of law such as fundamental rights
of speech and expression, religious freedom, or regarding
questions of federalism.
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